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Abstract This paper analyzes the determinants of governance transparency. In our
model, entrepreneurs optimally decide the precision of their earning reporting by trad-
ing off the possibility of expropriating profits against the capacity to attract external
funding. We find that information is only valuable if enough quality of it is disclosed.
Otherwise, the entrepreneur will always pretend to be unsuccessful and the capital
market will break down. If, by contrast, a minimum precision level is ensured, fund
diversionwill be zero but full disclosure is still not achieved.We show that an important
driving force behind governance transparency is product market competition. Tougher
competition leads to more firms competing for funding, which in turn changes how
resources are allocated since each individual firm becomes less important in the port-
folio choice. Firms react to this loss of market power by increasing transparency.
Furthermore, firms characterized by low corporate profits or firms in a country with a
strong legal system will be more likely to avoid voluntary disclosure regimes.
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Incentives · Product market competition
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1 Introduction
Due to the emerging market crisis of the 1990s and recent corporate governance and
accounting scandals, the desirability of disclosure requirements has long been a major
subject of debate among policymakers and academics. However, there is no agreement
on the optimal level of financial accounting information and its regimes vary widely
around the world. At one extreme, much of the literature is skeptical about the need
for compulsory transparency—except perhaps in the extreme case of market failure—
because market forces will generally ensure the optimal level of information. At the
other extreme, it is often argued that a higher level of financial accounting increases
market liquidity and firm valuation.1 However, we do not observe firms providing full
disclosure. We therefore need to gain a better understanding of the variables affecting
the transparency of corporate reporting.
This paper tackles an important area of corporate governance: the determinants
of voluntary governance transparency. To this end, we develop a theoretical model
of corporate transparency, treating governance disclosure as an endogenous variable
and assuming that entrepreneurs control the precision of the information available
to outside investors. The model is used to address the following kinds of research
questions: (i) With regard to the factors affecting disclosure: Why do firms engage in
voluntary transparency?Howdoes productmarket competition affect voluntary disclo-
sure? (ii) With regard to the governance role of publicly reported financial accounting
information: What is the relation among publicly reported financial accounting infor-
mation, corporate governance, and management incentives? (iii) With regard to the
economic consequences of disclosure for financial markets: How do investors respond
to corporate disclosures? That is, how does disclosure affect resource allocation in the
economy? Is disclosure necessary for the functioning of the capital market?
The scenario we consider assumes that entrepreneurs have no wealth and need
capital from investors to carry out a risky project. Both are symmetrically informed
when they enter into a contractual agreement. After contracting, however, firms are
better informed than outside investors on the project’s realization: the former know the
returns realized, whereas the outside investors only observe a signal of these returns.
The precision of this signal is our measure of governance transparency. Since entre-
preneurs have more information, they can divert funds at the expense of firm value.
Because of this, investors offer a contract to entrepreneurs that is designed to limit the
level of expropriation. The contract, which is contingent on the firms’s report—and
thus on all observable variables, including the precision of the signal—is defined by
the amount of capital that investors put into the firm as well as by a payment made by
investors to entrepreneurs. The contract endogenously determines the central trade-off
for the entrepreneur when deciding the optimal level of transparency because better
quality of information decreases the possibility of expropriation against the capacity
to attract external funding.
1 See Leuz and Wysocki (2008) for an analysis on the capital market outcome of disclosure.
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The model is based on the following three key assumptions. First, we develop the
model in a setting with product market competition. Second, outside investors are risk
averse and rationally formulate their asset allocations and consumption-saving deci-
sions. Third, the information disclosed by the firmneeds to be verifiable. Because firms
have incentives to disclose self-serving information, it is unclear whether increased
transparency actually reflects credible information. In practice, there are two potential
ways to increase the credibility of voluntary disclosure. Investors can write an ex-ante
contract with a third-party who can provide assurance about the quality of the firms’
disclosures. Alternatively, firms can be taken to court ex-post by investors. This study
focuses on the second mechanism.2
We find that low quality information does not have much value, and information is
only valuable if enough quality of it is disclosed. That is, to incentivize a legal action,
investors need a certain threshold level of quality of information, otherwise, the entre-
preneur will always pretend to be unsuccessful and the capital market will break down.
If, by contrast, a minimum precision level is ensured, the optimal level of disclosure
enhances its governance role since, in equilibrium, entrepreneurial funds diversion is
zero but full disclosure does not prevail. Therefore, transparency becomes the solution
to the agency problem, and the entrepreneur will voluntarily choose a strictly positive
but far from perfect level of disclosure even though, ex-post, he prefers opacity as it
allows him to divert cash flows.
In addition to this, we find a closed-form solution to the optimal level of transpar-
ency. Consequently, our theory indicates the driving forces of voluntary transparency
and helps us predict which firms are likely to engage in strategies to avoid a proposed
regulation. The model delivers the following predictions.
First, we find that a more competitive environment increases the quality of finan-
cial accounting information through a change in the optimal portfolio of investors.
The greater the number of firms in the product market, the more firms competing for
funding. This, in turn, changes how resources are allocated in the economy because
investors adjust their portfolio choices. Specifically, investors like to diversify risk and
each individual firm becomes less important in the portfolio choice. As a result, each
entrepreneur has less market power, and is forced to make the concession of offering
high governance transparency.
Second, we find that a weak legal system or regime (i.e., lower penalties in the case
of being taken to court) increases voluntary disclosure. This is the case since when
courts are weaker, the only way that firms will be able to persuade outsiders to invest
is by practicing stronger transparency.
Third, we find that better governance transparency may be driven by higher corpo-
rate profits. Under higher profits, the agency problem is more severe because entrepre-
neurs have stronger incentives to divert profits, forcing them to impose ex-ante stricter
governance disclosure mechanisms as a commitment device to prevent ex-post expro-
priation. This result provides a rationale for higher regulation in an economic upturn.
The next section places this study in the context of the existing literature. After
presenting the model in Sect. 3, we derive the optimal contract in Sect. 4. Section 5
2 For a discussion of the literature using the first mechanism see Sect. 4.3.
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completes the paper with a discussion of the intended contribution, the limitations of
this study, and opportunities for future research. TheAppendix contains all the omitted
proofs.
2 Relation to the existing theoretical literature
This paper is related to the growing body of literature analyzing governance disclo-
sure at the firm level as well as the literature on corporate governance in competitive
settings.
Concerning the first branch of the literature, the papers most closely related to the
present one are those of Song and Thakor (2006) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2008).
Song and Thakor (2006) recognize that the CEO controls the information seen by the
board. However, they introduce career concerns on the part of the board and CEO,
and these interact with each other.3 In their model, the CEO’s expected utility is the
sum of firm value and career concerns, which are functions of how either the board
or the shareholders perceive the CEO’s ability level. Hermalin and Weisbach (2008)
consider the effect of optimal disclosure rules, which are controlled by the principal.
When determining optimal disclosure, the principal trade-off is that whereas higher
disclosure allows for better monitoring of management, it can also increase mana-
gerial compensation, and distortions in managerial behavior. While the two models
and their objectives differ, there is a common finding indicating that, due to career
concerns, CEOs try to affect how they are evaluated, either by decreasing disclosure or
by taking actions that can distort owner’s information. Another important contribution
dealing with disclosure is that of Adams and Ferreira (2007), whose model focuses
on different issues than the present paper: namely, the implications of the board’s dual
roles in advising and monitoring the firm’s management.4
We extend and complement the existing literature in several ways. First, the previ-
ous work on governance disclosure has ignored the issue of contracts. In a setting of
information asymmetries, we introduce entrepreneurial funds diversion instead, and
concentrate on agency problems between firms and investors. In the theory proposed
here, parties write contracts, and we analyze the implications of this contracting for
the optimal level of firm transparency, for entrepreneurial incentives to misbehave,
and for resource allocation in the economy. Second, since we derive disclosure rules
endogenously and based on profit-maximizing rules, this allows us to understand the
factors shaping the quality of information reported by firms. In particular, this paper
expands the conflicting literature on corporate governance and competition by explain-
ing a new channel through which product market competition may affect governance
transparency.
The common wisdom from the literature dealing with corporate governance is that
product market competition can impose discipline on a firm’s management. Competi-
tion between different firms may help to limit losses as well as levels of expropriation.
3 By career concerns they mean the perception of how the agent’s human capital is valued by the market
since it determines retention and compensation decisions.
4 Similarly, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms in the context
of positive externalities in the form of information transfers.
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As a result, economies with a high level of competition are characterized by a strong
level of corporate governance (see Allen and Gale 2000; Hart 1983; Stigler 1958;
Vives 2000, among others). However, as Holmström and Tirole (1989, 97) point out
“apparently, the simple idea that product market competition reduces slack is not as
easy to formalize as one might think.” Indeed, Scharfstein (1988) introduces more
general preferences to the framework proposed by Hart (1983), and finds that com-
petition actually increases slack. We reach the conclusion that tougher competition
increases the quality of financial accounting information through a different channel:
by adjusting the investor’s portfolio choices. We are not aware of any paper to date
that explicitly states this precise channel.
Equally importantly, it should be noted that our theory opens the door for a new line
of research on empirical issues in governance transparency, in which the new mech-
anism should be tested and control variables proposed to examine the determinants
of firm-level governance disclosure. Although the evidence supports the arguments
advanced here,more research is needed to further support the importance of our theory.
3 The model
The economy is described by a two-period model and is populated by two types of
agents: entrepreneurs and a representative investor. Since entrepreneurs have no capi-
tal endowment, they have to raise money on financial markets to exploit the potential
production possibilities. The investor, on the other hand, is endowed with capital.
Capital markets are subject to imperfections arising from the non-observability of
output for financiers, and formal contracting arrangements are adopted to amend these
frictions.
3.1 The set up
3.1.1 Entrepreneurs
Consider a framework with N firms—also called entrepreneurs—which are risk neu-
tral and without initial wealth, but endowed with a risky project. The riskiness arises
from the fact that only one firm pays off and thus kit units of capital invested in firm i
will return the next period to firm i either RNkit with probability
1
N , or nothing with
probability 1− 1N , with i = 1, . . . , N . That is, the payoff from the investment in each
firm takes the values {RN, 0}.
We have rescaled R according to N to keep the average profitability of the pro-
ject constant. Therefore, increasing N will increase competition and will only affect
the risk since it makes success more difficult.5 We attempt to capture the general
belief supported in the theoretical and empirical literature that competition is a key
5 Giroud and Mueller (2010) show empirically that an increase in competition reduces a firm’s profits. In
our model, competition does not translate into a direct reaction to a fall in profits but the analysis is robust to
the alternative specification of competition affecting both risk and expected profits (see a previous version
of the paper at http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/9340/1/we10-21.pdf).
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Table 1 The binary signal
(model)
RH = RN RL = 0
s = sH pi 1 − pi
s = sL 1 − pi pi
mechanism threatening the survival of the firm since with a large number of firms only
the more efficient ones—only one in our model—will survive.6
Entrepreneurs must obtain funds from investors to finance the project and contract-
ing arrangements are adopted between them. As we will see in detail, the contract
consists in the amount of investment made in firm i, i.e. kit and a transfer, which is
contingent on the firm’s report, paid by the investor to firm i .
3.1.2 Information structure
From the point of view of a single firm, the output realization per unit of capital
invested is either RN or 0, and the success probability is 1N . Although the probabil-
ity distribution is common knowledge to all agents in the economy, its realizations
are private information to the firms. The representative investor, on the other hand,
receives a private binary symmetric signal s with two possible values: high or low and
with the probabilities given in Table 1.
The symmetry of the signal does not restrict the generality of the analysis and sim-
plifies the exposition. When the signal is symmetric, by convention pi ∈ [ 12 , 1], so
that when the return is high we have p(sH/RH ) = pi , while when the return is low
we have p(sL/RL) = 1 − pi . Let 1N and 1 − 1N be the prior probability of a high
and low state of nature, respectively, for an investor with no private signal. An agent
endowed with a signal s updates this probability using Bayes’ rule, so that, conditional
on receiving a high signal, the posterior probability becomes,
p (RH |sH ) = p(sH |RH )p(RH )
p(sH |RH )p(RH ) + p(sH |RL)p(RL) =
pi 1N





and p (RL |sH ) = 1 − p (RH |sH ) . And conditional on receiving a low signal, the
update forecast is
p (RH |sL) = p(sL |RH )p(RH )
p(sL |RH )p(RH ) + p(sL |RL)p(RL) =
(1 − pi ) 1N





and p (RL |sL) = 1 − p (RH |sL) .
6 Mata et al. (1995) empirically examine the factors that influence the probability of a firm’s survival on
the market and show that market size is an important determinant of firm success. Similarly, Guadalupe
and Pérez-González (2006) find that a higher default probability is associated with tougher competition.
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Under perfect information, it will be either pi = 1 or pi = 0, while the signal
conveys no information about the realization of the project when pi = 12 . Clearly, the
parameter pi measures the precision of the signal and is a variable of crucial interest.
The better the quality of the signal received by the investor, the easier it will be to
protect herself from attempts at expropriation by some of the firms. This is the reason
why we take the quality of this signal as an indicator of the quality of governance
transparency. In particular, we will show that contracting arrangements endogenously
determine how the firms decide about the degree of voluntary governance disclosure,
i.e. the value of pi , by trading-off the benefit of attracting more capital against the
possibility of expropriating profits.
3.1.3 The representative investor
The inclusion of investors in the model will provide a better understanding of how
investors allocate resources in the economy, how they respond to corporate disclosures
and if disclosure practices are necessary for the functioning of capital markets.
The investor is concerned about consumption, saving, and portfolio choice deci-
sions. We assume she is risk averse with the following Cobb–Douglas specification of
the utility function,
Ut = c1−αt cαt+1,
where ct is the amount consumed in period one, and ct+1 is consumption in period
two. In the first period, the available resources K , can be used either to consume or




kit = K , (3)
where kit is the amount invested in firm i , and thus
∑N
i=1 kit is the total amount of
resources invested in all N firms. In the second period, the budget constraint is ct+1 ≤
yt+1, with yt+1 being the investor’s income coming from the payoff of the diversified
portfolio, that is
yt+1 = Rckit − wi (Rc),
with Rc ∈ {RN, 0} and the superscript c referring to firm’s claim, and wi being the
equilibrium transfer that the investor pays to firm i . In Sect. 4 we will show how
this transfer is determined in the equilibrium contract. Not surprisingly, it will be
contingent on the firm’s report and all observables—including pi .
In practice, investors have difficulties accessing whether information is credible.
Although investors may have strong incentives to detect fraud, they do not always
act accordingly because they have inferior access to information. For this reason,
we introduce courts whose task is to collect and assess information that can lead to
the detection of fraud. We consider credibility issues in the simplest way as a small,
preliminary step toward a comprehensive theory as future research.
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The investor decides whether to go to court or not on the basis of the signal and
the firm’s report. Investors could derive benefits from taking the entrepreneur to court
because, if found guilty, the entrepreneurs will have to give back the hidden returns, i.e.
[RN − 0]kit . However, accessing court is also costly. To simplify the math, we assume
that this cost is proportional to the recovery of hidden output, i.e. φ[RN − 0]kit .7 If
taken to court by outside investors and found guilty of fraud, entrepreneurs, apart from
giving back the hidden returns, will also be obligated to pay a penalty cost which is pro-
portional to the capital invested in the project, i.e. Fkit .
8 Notice that, unlike the hidden
returns, which are given back to investors if the entrepreneur is guilty, both the entre-
preneurs’ and the investors’ court fees are deadweight cost and thus no one gets them.
The exogenous parameters F and φ represent the strength of the country’s legal
system. Indeed, the larger the F , the more rigorously the country’s antifraud law is
enforced and likewise, a smaller accessing court cost φ would imply a more developed
country’s legal system.9
3.1.4 Timing
Contracting takes place in the ex-ante stage, that is, before the realization of the output
is known. In the first period, entrepreneurs are endowed with a project. Each firm
chooses the level of transparency, and goes to the capital market announcing simulta-
neously its pi and asking for financial needs. Next, the representative investor, who is
endowed with K units of capital, offers a contract to each firm. The contract, which is
contingent on the firm’s report, consists of the amount of investmentmade in the firm kit
and a contingent transferwi,h, wi,l paid by the investor to the firm.After that, each firm
either accepts the contract and borrows kit to establish the firm, or rejects the contract.
At the outset of the second period, a firm produces output equal to either RNkit
or 0. This realization is private information for the entrepreneurs, who have the option
of hiding some of their cash flows from their financiers. The investor, by contrast,
receives a private signal with the probabilities distribution given in Table 1. Once the
project is realized, the firm makes a claim about its realization Rc ∈ {RN, 0}, where
the superscript c refers to the firms’ claim, and the contract is satisfied. That is, the
firms give the investor the intermediary output consistent with the claim (i.e. RNkit
or 0) and receive a contingent transfer.
Based on the private signal and the claim, the representative investor then decides
whether or not to go to court, but going to court is costly for her. Courts, which are
modeled in a reduced form, have the role of collecting the information that might lead
to the detection of fraud, and acting upon it accordingly. If the entrepreneur is lying,
the court will surely find him guilty, the entrepreneur must pay the penalty Fkit and
will also be forced to pay the representative investor her due returns.
7 Assuming a fixed cost of going to court, the results hold too.
8 The assumption of a proportional penalty cost is useful when solving the investor’s portfolio allocation.
It allows us to have a closed-form solution of the model.
9 Easy access to courts by shareholders is commonly viewed as an important element of a good corporate
governance system. For recent evidence on reforms encouraging shareholders suits see Enriques and Volpin
(2007).
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If the project is of low quality, entrepreneurs end up with income yi,t+1 = wi,l .
Without an endowment, the entrepreneur is unable to misreport in the low state, since
this would entail a level of output RNkit > 0. If the returns are high, truthful reporting
yields yi,t+1 = wi,h, and concealing yields yi,t+1 = wi,l +[RN−0]kit = wi,l +RNkit .
That is, by misreporting the entrepreneur receives the transfer intended for low return
projects plus the hidden output. If, however, the investor decides to go to court and the
firm is lying, the entrepreneur’s income becomes yi,t+1 = wi,l +RNkit − Fkit −RNkit .
The last two terms are the total cost imposed on the entrepreneur if lying (i.e. if the
entrepreneur reported low returns under a high returns realization): the entrepreneur
must pay the penalty Fkit as well as the confiscation of RNk
i
t .
As we will see later on, the equilibrium contract always requires the output surren-
dered to be consistent with the report. This implies no hiding along the equilibrium
path. We will solve the model using the standard backward induction: after studying
the optimal decision of the investor as to go to court or not, characterizing the optimal
transfer, and analyzing the investor’s portfolio decision, wewill study the firm’s choice
regarding the design of governance transparency.
4 The equilibrium contracts
The dominant entrepreneur’s strategy—independently of the returns realized—is to
claim low returns because in this way he can lie and steal some positive amount of
profits. Given that the entrepreneur has no cash, it is impossible for him to claim a
high cash flow realization when the actual realization is low.10 Therefore, the entre-
preneur’s strategy of claiming high returns is implicitly self-revealing and, given
that accessing court is costly for investors, it is useless to go to court. As a result,
the representative investor would decide to go to court iff the report were a low
one.
According to the timing, once returns are realized, and the contract is executed,
investor observes s and decides whether or not to go to court.11 The investor will
always face a trade-off between paying the costs in the hopes of recovering part of the
returns, and not doing so. If the court costs are high enough to discourage legal action
when the signal is low, but low enough to incentivize legal action when the signal is
high, the investor will optimally minimize the decision to go to court and will use the
court option only if the claim is low and the signal is high. This would happen under
assumptions A1 and A2 below.
If the signal is high, with probability p(RH/sH ), the returns are going to be high.
If the entrepreneurs’ claim were low and the investor goes to court, the entrepreneur
10 Following Innes (1990), the investor’s payoffs are going to be increasing in the reported returns—as
stated in the proof of Proposition 1.Under thismonotonicity constraint, entrepreneurswould never engage in
arbitrage activities. Specifically, entrepreneurs would never revise their profits report upward by borrowing
money temporarily and this borrowing being undetected.
11 The model is robust to a slight change in the timing. Specifically, we could assume that the events were
as follows: first, the entrepreneurs make a claim and output is surrendered accordingly. After that, investors
decide whether to go to court or not. Consistent with the court decision, the investor will give the transfer
to the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur will give back the diverted output to investors if they were lying.
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is found guilty and the investor income is yt+1 = RN(1 − φ)kit − wi,l . That is, the
investor receives the output surrendered consistent with the low claim, i.e. zero, and the
entrepreneur receives the transfer intended for a low return wi,l . Moreover, the hidden
output is recovered but the cost of accessing court needs to be paid, i.e. RN(1− φ)kit .
However, with probability p(RL/sH ), the investor goes to court and since the claim
coincides with the returns, the entrepreneur was telling the truth. Investor income is
yt+1 = −φRNkit − wi,l . All in all, when the investor is endowed with a high sig-




t (1 − φ) − wi,l)
≥ p(RL/sH )(φRNkit + wi,l) ⇐⇒ pi ≥
φ(N − 1)
(1 − φ) + φ(N − 1) . (4)
To obtain the last inequality, first we have substituted the posterior probabilities
given in Eqs. (1) and (2), and second, we have imposed wi,l = 0. As explained in
Sect. 4, since under a low state of nature the output is zero and limited liability is
assumed, the equilibrium transfer upon a low realization will be zero too.
If the investor is endowed with a low signal, the posterior probability of having a
high return and a low return are p(RH /sL) and p(RL/sL), respectively. In the first
case the entrepreneur is lying since his claimwas low and the investor income of going
to court is yt+1 = RNkit (1 − φ) − wi,l , but in the second he is telling the truth with
the investor income being yt+1 = −φRNkit − wi,l . The investor will decide not to go
to court if the expected net profits are such that
p(RH/sL)(RNk
i
t (1 − φ) − wi,l)
≤ p(RL/sL)(φRNkit + wi,l) ⇐⇒ pi ≥
(1 − φ)
(1 − φ) + φ(N − 1) . (5)
Likewise, to obtain the last inequality, we have substituted the posterior probabili-









(1−φ)+φ(N−1) holds and then the
investor needs to take into account only the inequality given in Eq. (4). Intuitively,
when the investor sees pi and it is larger than or equal to the threshold given in Eq.
(4), the investor’s threat of only going to court under a low claim and a high signal
is credible. The reverse is true for any 12 ≤ pi < φ(N−1)(1−φ)+φ(N−1) . In this case it is not
optimal for the investor to go to court in any case, the investor’s threat of going to
court is not credible, and the entrepreneur will always pretend to be unsuccessful. But
then, the capital market breaks down, which is clearly inefficient.12 Consequently, the
12 We reach the same conclusion if accessing courts is costly but entrepreneurs are not forced to pay the
investor her due returns when found guilty.
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entrepreneur maximization problem will be subject to the constraint given by Eq. (4).
In Sect. 4.2 we will show that, under credible strategies, the optimal level of transpar-
ency should be more stringent and thus in equilibrium pi will be strictly larger than 12 .
We assume that (A2) always holds
φ <
R(N − 1)α
R(N − 1)α + (N − 1)[F(N − α) + R(1 − α)N ] . (A2)
Let us concentrate on the more interesting case, that is, when the investor’s threat to
go to court is credible, so that the entrepreneur is taken to court only when his claim is
low and the signal is high.13 The incentive compatibility constraint under low returns
reads as follows:
piwi,l + (1 − pi )wi,l ≥ pi {wi,h + [0 − RN]kit } + (1 − pi ){wi,h + [0 − RN]kit },
(ICL)
where the RHS is the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he lies and claims a high
return: given a realization of low returns, the signal would be low with probability
pi and high with probability 1 − pi . In both cases, by misreporting the entrepreneur
receives the transfer wi,h and steals [0 − RN]kit . The LHS is the expected utility if
he tells the truth, and it shows that with probability 1 − pi the return and the claim
are both low but the signal is high, so the investor goes to court. However, since the
entrepreneur is not guilty, he does not pay the penalty cost.
The inequality above can be rewritten as
wi,l − wi,h ≥ −RNkit , ∀i = 1, . . . , N .
Analogously, when the returns are high, the utility of the entrepreneur reporting the
truth has to be higher than or equal to the utility if he lies
piwi,h + (1 − pi )wi,h ≥ pi {wi,l + [RN − 0]kit − Fkit − [RN − 0]kit }
+(1 − pi ){wi,l + RNkit }. (ICH)
The RHS tells us that with probability pi , the returns as well as the signal are high.
Since the entrepreneur misreports with a low claim, he receives the transfer wi,l and
steals [RN−0]kit . But then the investor goes to court, the entrepreneur is caught lying,
and he is forced to pay the penalty cost Fkit as well as to pay back the investor her
due returns. With probability 1− pi , the signal is high and the returns are low and the
entrepreneur’s claim is low, but the investor does not go to court. As a consequence, the
entrepreneur receiveswi,l and the diverted funds [RN−0]kit . The ICH can bewritten as
13 If we assume that accessing courts is costless, investors will always take the entrepreneur to court
whenever the claim is low and independently of the signal. As a result, in equilibrium, entrepreneurs will
always tell the truth independently of pi . Since this paper studies the determinants of transparency, this
case loses importance.
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wi,h − wi,l ≥ [RN(1 − pi ) − pi F]kit , ∀i = 1, . . . , N .
The next lemma shows that in equilibrium, the ICH is binding, and the ICL never
binds. The intuition is clear: having no endowment, an entrepreneur is unable to mis-
report in the low state since that would entail surrendering a positive amount.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint under high returns
is binding, while the incentive compatibility under low returns is not.
Proof The two IC conditions are (RN(1− pi )− pi F)kit ≤ wi,h −wi,l ≤ RNkit . Since
the investor needs to induce truthful reporting, she tries to pay as little as possible
under this condition. This is why the left inequality must be binding, which in turn
implies that the right inequality is strict. 	unionsq
Proposition 1 specifies the equilibrium contingent transfer. Intuitively, what deter-
mines the entrepreneur’s truthful reporting decision is the gap between wages, that is
wi,h −wi,l , and not their absolute values. This implies that the representative investor
wants to give the lowest possible payoff, which is zero given limited liability upon low
realization, i.e. wi,l = 0, and the minimum incentive compatible reward upon high
realization in order to prevent diversion, i.e. wi,h = (RN(1 − pi ) − pi F)kit .
Proposition 1 The optimal contract offered by the investor to an entrepreneur with
pi induces truthful reporting and is given by:
wi,l∗ = 0, wi,h∗ = (RN(1 − pi ) − pi F)kit for every i = 1, . . . , N . (6)
Proof See Appendix. 	unionsq
The transfer per dollar invested decreases with F and pi . When either F or pi are
low, the entrepreneur can keep a higher amount of each dollar diverted. The optimal
transfer intuitively predicts that when the cost of diversion is lower, the incentives
needed to correct agency problems must be stronger, and thus the transfer will be
higher.
The transfer needed to induce entrepreneurs’ truthful behavior can also be inter-
preted as the informational cost of capital paid by the investors, or the cost of trading
capital due to agency problems.When F and pi are low, investor protection is low and
thus the transfer per dollar invested from investor to entrepreneurs should increase.
Therefore, a low level of investor protection leads to a high level of informational cost
of capital. This finding is consistent with a number of theoretical papers showing that
there is a negative correlation between investor protection and the cost of capital (see
for instance, Castro et al. 2004;Himmelberg et al. 2004; Shleifer andWolfenzon 2002).
In their models, however, the story is different: when investor protection is perfect,
managers optimally diversify fully idiosyncratic risk and steal nothing since insiders
are risk averse. By contrast, under imperfect investor protection, insiders can credibly
commit to lower rates of stealing by retaining a higher fraction of equity. Since they
are forced to bear higher levels of diversifiable risk, risk sharing is not complete and
thus the cost of capital increases. Their predictions are first, the weaker the investor
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protection, the higher the concentration of inside equity ownership; and second, the
higher the concentration of inside ownership, the lower the degree of diversification
and thus the higher the implied cost of capital.
The empirical evidence reported by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) documents that
firms’ cost of capital decreases when they increase transparency. Similarly, Doidge
et al. (2004) show that foreign firms with cross listings in the U.S., which are subject
to higher accounting disclosure provisions than their foreign counterparts, have higher
valuations and a lower cost of capital.14
Since higher levels of pi and F lead to a higher level of investor protection, inves-
tors always prefer higher governance transparency and penalties to lower ones. In the
extreme case of F = 0 and the entrepreneur not being forced to pay back he due
return to the investor, all the power would be in the entrepreneur’s hands. The investor
would therefore never have access to credible information and then there would be
no sense in talking about the trade-off of the signal because there would no longer
be informational rents. This shows a mutual connection between the elements of a
country’s institutional infrastructure and voluntary disclosure by the firm.15 More-
over, since the investor’s preferences about the penalty F are not aligned with those
of the entrepreneurs, clearly if F were part of the optimally chosen contract term, the
penalty payment would always be strictly positive.
4.1 Portfolio choice
In what follows, we first analyze how the investor rationally formulates her portfo-
lio decisions. Then we look at how governance disclosure affects the allocation of
resources among the different firms.
The representative investor solves the following maximization problem





subject to (3) & ct+1 ≤ yt+1,
yt+1 = RNkit − wi,h∗ if si , with i = 1, . . . N ,
where si is when the state of nature i occurs, which is the state where only firm i
succeeds and all others fail. The value of wi,h∗ is given by Proposition 1. Define
p˜ = 1N−1
∑
i = j pit as the average level of governance transparency of all other firms.
The demand of capital for each risky firm is given by the next proposition.
14 However, as Leuz and Wysocki (2008) point out, this line of research is still in its infancy and certainly
needs to be validated through further empirical research.
15 If we assume that F = 0 and the entrepreneur is forced to pay back the stolen returns, our main
results apply but we cannot analyze how the strength of the legal system would affect the optimal level of
transparency.
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Proof See Appendix. 	unionsq
Other things being equal, the higher the quality of the signal in firm i , the higher
the capital invested in this company.16 The rationale behind this result is clear: better
transparency does pay. It cuts the costs of external financing, which results in a real-
location of resources from firms with a low level of transparency to more attractive
firms characterized by more transparent financial accounting information.17 That is,
our theory predicts that better governance transparency enables firms to access capital
markets on better terms, which is valuable to firms intending to raise funds. Consistent
with this idea, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that firms in industries with significant
needs for external financing, such as the pharmaceutical industry, grew substantially
faster during the 1980s in countries with more demanding accounting-disclosure stan-
dards than firms in the same industries in countries with weak accounting-disclosure
standards. Similarly, in a review of the empirical research on disclosure, Healy and
Palepu (2001) report that voluntary disclosure policies are more often found in firms
issuing new capital.
4.2 Determinants of transparency
Having characterized the optimal transfer and portfolio investment decisions, we are
now in a position to take a step back and examine the driving forces behind gover-
nance transparency. The transfer ensuring no hiding along the equilibrium path, the
stock of capital invested in the firm, and the minimum level of voluntary transparency
that the investor is asking for, are the three key ingredients in solving the following
entrepreneur problem,
Maxpi E(U
i ) = 1
N
(RN(1 − pi ) − pi F)ki∗t ,
subject to equations (7) & (4)
16 Another channel by which transparency may affect capital markets is through changes in the equilibrium
stock return. However, asset pricing is beyond the scope of this paper. For studies that incorporate the effect
of agency cost on equilibrium asset prices see Albuquerque and Wang (2008) and Dow et al. (2005).
17 If the returns from the investment were heterogeneous across firms, financial accounting information
would identify promising investment opportunities, meaning that financial capital would flow toward firms
with prospects of high returns and away from sectors with poor prospects. This would lead directly to more
efficient allocation of capital to the highest valued use.
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The next proposition first shows that even though the entrepreneur would like to
divert cash flows ex-post, and transparency limits his ability to do so, he voluntarily
chooses a strictly positive level of transparency ex-ante to be able to raise capital. The
proposition also highlights the importance of not just a single variable when explain-
ing its disclosure practices, but a range of variables related to the market structure of
an industry, the enforcement of the law in the country as well as the firm’s corporate
profits.
Proposition 3 Under A2, the optimal level of voluntary governance transparency by





α(N − 1) + (1 − α)N
)
, (8)
with 1/2 < p∗ < 1. Moreover, the following comparative statics hold: p∗ is (i) strictly
increasing with the level of competition, N , (i i) strictly increasing with the level of
corporate profits for the firm, R and (i i i) strictly decreasing with the weakness of the
legal system, F.
Proof See Appendix. 	unionsq
Notice that in the good state, the optimal transfer is wh∗(p∗) > 0, and then, con-
sumption is positive for both investors and entrepreneurs.18 On the contrary, because
limited liability constraints, wl∗ necessarily equals zero in the bad state. The model
delivers several predictions.
First, the model demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, more product market competi-
tion leads to substantial improvements in voluntary transparency. In fact, as N increases
first, capital markets become more developed since more firms are seeking financing
and thus the potential number of securities in an investor’s portfolio increases. And
second, the investment risk of each firm or project increases. Both effects together
signify that there are more firms to invest in, but each one becomes less important on
the optimal portfolio choice of investors overall, which in turn entails that the firm has
less monopoly power. Hence, the only possibility firms have to attract more capital is
to increase governance transparency.
In a recent empirical paper, Giroud and Mueller (2010) show that firms in non-
competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after
the passage of an anti-takeover law. By contrast, firms in highly competitive indus-
tries experience no significant effect, so managerial slack appears to increase only in
non-competitive industries. In a subsequent paper, using the democracy-dictatorship
hedge portfolio in Gompers et al. (2003), Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that the
effect of governance on firms’ operating performance, long-horizon stock returns or
firm value is relatively small in competitive industries compared to non-competitive
18 That is, limited liability constraints 0 ≤ wh∗ ≤ RNkit are introduced but are not binding in the good
state, i.e. [RN(1 − p∗) − Fp∗)]kit < RNkit .
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industries, where governancematters more. Likewise, Guadalupe and Pérez-González
(2006) find that product market competition is strongly negative correlated with pri-
vate benefits of control. They also find that competition affects corporate governance
by increasing the quality of information available to investors and by increasing the
default probability.19
Although these empirical papers find a positive link between product market com-
petition and corporate governance, this is not a direct test of the model proposed here.
First, because they do not focus on firms’ disclosure measures and financial reporting
standards; and second, because none of them assess our proposed disciplining forces
that competition imposes on the governance disclosure decisions of firms. Clearly,
more research on this subject would be useful to validate the importance of our theory.
Second, the stronger the legal system, the lower the level of governance trans-
parency. The exogenous penalty cost F reflects the effectiveness of a country’s legal
system; a higher penalty cost when an entrepreneur is found guilty means better inves-
tor protection. It is worth noting that our theory does not attempt to claim that quality
accounting is a replacement for country-level legal reform. Rather, the model suggests
that firms in countries with poor investor protection can improve it by adopting better
accounting standards.
In general, it is not clear whether a country-level legal infrastructure and voluntary
governance transparency will act as substitutes or complements. One possibility is
that firms in countries with weak laws would want to adopt better governance trans-
parency to counterbalance the weaknesses in their country’s legal system and signal
their intention to ensure greater investor rights. This would suggest a negative correla-
tion between governance transparency and country-level laws. By contrast, a second
possibility is that in countries with weak laws, governance transparency would tend
to be lower.
On the empirical side, this relationship of substitutability between the strength of
the legal system and firm-level corporate governance and disclosure rankings is in line
with the empirical evidence of Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005) and
Bruno andClaessens (2010). Similarly, using amodification of Shleifer andWolfenzon
(2002)’s model, Doidge et al. (2004) show that although country-level governance is
an important determinant of firm-level corporate governance, when firms have access
to global capital markets, country characteristics matter less in explaining the quality
of governance practices at the firm level. Baht et al. (2006) and Bushman et al. (2004)
show the same results using governance transparency measures. Leuz et al. (2003) and
Ball et al. (2000) suggest that the quality of financial accounting information is limited
instead by institutional factors. As far as we know, there is little empirical work on this
issue and further research would help us to understand the interactions between insti-
tutional laws at the country level and voluntary governance transparency by the firm.
Third, our theory also shows that the degree of corporate profits may shape the
degree of voluntary transparency. When corporate profits are high, agency prob-
lems become significant because the entrepreneur has more incentives to expropri-
ate. As a result, the firm would find it optimal to impose ex-ante stricter governance
19 For an empirical analysis of how product market competition affects incentives contract through exec-
utive compensation packages see, for example, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009).
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regulation mechanisms as a commitment device to prevent ex-post expropriation.
Hermalin (2008) also concludes that there is a positive correlation between quality of
governance and corporate performance. In his theoretical model, like us, firm value
determines the level of corporate governance. Unlike us, there is firm heterogeneity in
marginal returns to resources. Firmswith greatermarginal returns raise higher external
financing and thus have stronger corporate governance, which in turn increases profits.
Our third result is in line with the work of Himmelberg et al. (1999), who argue that
some firms find it easier to expropriate from minority shareholders due to the nature
of their operations. For example, the composition of a firm’s assets will affect its con-
tracting environment because it is easier to monitor and harder to steal fixed assets
(i.e., machinery and equipment) than “soft” capital (i.e., intangibles, R&D capital, and
short-term assets, such as inventories). Therefore, firms operating with higher propor-
tions of intangible assets may find it optimal to adopt higher governance transparency
to signal to investors that they intend to prevent the future misuse of these assets.
The empirical work of Gompers et al. (2003) and Klapper and Love (2004) shows
a positive and strong correlation between corporate governance at the firm level and
firms’ operating performance. Because of data limitations, however, they do not ana-
lyze the causality issues in depth. Gompers et al. (2003) construct a governance
index to proxy for shareholders rights whereas the governance score of Klapper and
Love (2004) reports data over seven broad categories measuring management dis-
cipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility and fairness. The
present paper demonstrates that if we focus only on governance disclosure, the cau-
sality between transparency and firm performance could go in the opposite direction
instead.
Since profits increase during an upswing and decrease during a recession, our anal-
ysis would suggest that it is during economic upturns that we need greater governance
vigilance. This is so because agency problems increase during economic upturns,
and thus we would find that the quality of governance needs to be improved in a
boom.20
Overall, the study of the determinants of governance transparency shows us a bot-
tom line history: firms for whom access to capital markets is important have incentives
to signal their intentions to offer higher quality of information. Transparency then acts
as a disciplining device, and markets are likely to reward those firms that opt for this
type of commitment device. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that one
of the main roles of publicly reported financial accounting information in corporate
governance is to protect external financiers.
4.3 Discussion of modeling assumptions
The results of this study are based on a reduced form model involving a number of
strong assumptions.We noted in a number of places throughout the article that many of
our results are quite robust to the model specifications. However, this study is subject
20 For papers that study business cycle variation in the degree of corporate control friction see Philippon
(2006) and Dow et al. (2005).
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to several shortcomings. One clear example is the assumption of the winner takes-it-all
type of competition. Specifically, we consider N firms endowed with a risky project.
In the case of success, only one firm gets the profit of all market RN, which occurs
with probability 1N , whereas the other N − 1 firms fail with probability 1− 1N and the
realized return is zero. The assumption of competition of the winner takes-it-all type
leads to the perfectly negative correlation of output outcomes. Therefore, investing in
a risky firm is equivalent to buying a basic Arrow security that pays in only one state of
nature (i.e. an investment of kit units of capital in firm i pays the amount RNk
i
t if firm i
succeeds with probability 1N and nothing otherwise).
21 Under this assumption we can
have a closed solution for the portfolio choice and consequently, for the optimal level
of transparency. Another implication of this assumption is that the larger the number
of firms in the market, i.e. large N , the more firms will seek funding. In this case,
however, investors will change their behavior in order to reduce their risk in such a
way that fewer resources will be invested in each firm.
The assumption of perfectly negative correlation of output may be hard to rational-
ize empirically. Yet the idea behind it is that most economies have access to a large
number of imperfectly correlated risky projects and thus a significant part of the risk
investors face can be diversified. In developed economies in particular, diversification
opportunities are better since more risky projects are available to investors. In devel-
oping countries, by contrast, it is more likely that the existence of, for example, a
minimum requirement scale or a fixed cost for opening a firm would imply that not all
risky projects are available, thereby reducing the diversification opportunities. There-
fore, the assumption of imperfectly correlated risky projects fits better for developed
economies. In fact, one stylized fact relating diversification and growth is that less
developed countries are more volatile than more developed ones.22
Note that in our paper, entrepreneurs can be taken to court ex-post by investors with
the court providing assurance about the quality of firms’s disclosures. Alternatively,
investors can write an ex-ante contract specifying for example when the investor is
going to court or when to audit a borrower who fails to meet contractual obligations.
The costly state verification literature concentrates on this second mechanism (see,
for example, Townsend 1979; Gale and Hellwig 1985). Like us, Townsend (1979) and
Gale and Hellwig (1985), analyze a framework of asymmetric information where the
returns on a project are random and not observable by some agents. In their papers
the lender cannot observe the returns unless the lender undertakes an audit, which is
costly. The contract has to specify when an audit will be undertaken and how its result
will affect the payment to the lender. In our paper, however, the decision on whether
or not to go to court is based on both the claim and the signal. This is the reason why
the investor updates her beliefs. If the decision to go to court were specified ex-ante,
posterior probabilities would no longer be needed and, qualitatively, the results would
not change.
21 We have a total of N equally likely states of nature where in each state one firm succeeds with probability
1
N , and fails with probability 1 − 1N . For instance, since we have N firms confronted with independent
risk, and only one firm succeeds, offering N contracts generates the same diversification as a 2N contingent
market would.
22 See for example Koren and Tenreyro (2007).
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5 Conclusions
This paper develops a theoretical model of corporate transparency of firms, treating
governance disclosure as endogenous. The optimal level of transparency is chosen by
an entrepreneur raising capital in financial markets. The central trade-off when decid-
ing the quality of governance transparency is that higher quality information increases
the possibility of expropriating a larger share of the profits against the opportunity to
raise more capital in financial markets. The paper shows that, to incentivize a legal
action, investors need a certain threshold of quality of information, otherwise, investors
cannot credible commit and thus the capital market will break down. If, by contrast,
the quality of information is high enough, although entrepreneurial diverted funds are
zero in equilibrium, the optimal level of disclosure is far from perfect.
Furthermore, our theory indicates the driving forces of voluntary transparency and
helps us predict which firms are likely to engage in strategies to avoid a proposed
regulation. Indeed, tougher competition in the product market, a weak legal sys-
tem or a higher level of corporate profits are variables that increases governance
transparency.
Our results have several policy implications. According to our theory, firms in a
setting of high industry concentration or where the financial markets are not developed
would be more likely to lobby against voluntary disclosure regimes because diversi-
fication would be more difficult to achieve. Indeed, we would expect that if policy
makers concentrated their efforts on improving product market competition and cap-
ital markets, then financial transparency would increase as well.23 Finally, we have
also found that information is only valuable (that is, transactions occur and transpar-
ency solves the agency problem) if enough of it is disclosed. Therefore, another policy
implication is that regulating disclosure by requiring a minimal precision level for the
disclosures could be welfare improving.
Our model is one shot game involving one period of disclosure followed by one
transaction. It would be interesting to study the issues addressed in this paper in a
rich framework. For example, by studying the process of governance transparency
in a dynamic setting, the role of reputation and credibility issues as mechanisms for
solving information problems would provide further insights. Finally, and equally
importantly, the proposed theory opens the door to new research on empirical issues
of voluntary governance transparency, by testing the new mechanisms suggested in
the paper, and proposing new control variables to examine determinants of firm-level
disclosure in large cross-sectional data sets.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 First, to induce the incentive for truthful reporting, the
investor only needs to ensure that the wage difference wi,h∗ − wi,l∗ satisfies
23 For example, by enacting laws to make markets more competitive, and by promoting financial interme-
diation.
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(RN(1 − pi ) − pi F)kit ≤ wi,h − wi,l ≤ RNkit . Hence, the investor’s utility max-
imization implies wi,l∗ = 0.
Second, if the investor pays wi,h∗ > RNkit , the entrepreneur will lie when output is










[pi (RNkit − wi,h∗) + (1 − pi )(RNkit − wi,h∗)]
= RNkit − wi,h∗ < 0.
Hence, the investor will not pay wi,h∗ > RNkit . The other possibility is that the
investor may choose to pay wi,h∗ < (RN(1 − pi ) − pi F)kit . If so, the entrepreneur










[pi (0 − wi,l∗) + (1 − pi )(0 − wi,l∗)]
= −wi,l∗ = 0,
Hence, the investor has no incentive to pay wi,h∗ < (RN(1 − pi ) − pi F)kit . Note
that even when wi,h∗ = 0, the incentive compatible contract is not in place and the
firm will always optimally claim low returns realization. This implies that, whatever
the outcome of the returns, the investor’s expected income in the second period will
always be equal to zero.










[pi (−wi,l∗) + (1 − pi )(−wi,l∗)]
= 1
N
(RNkit − wi,h∗) =
1
N
pi (RN + F)kit > 0.
Observe that investor’s expected income is increasing with the level of corporate
governance at the firm and at the country level (i.e. pi and F). The larger these values,
the larger her bargaining power is. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Plugging the budget constraint into the utility function, the
utility function may be rearranged as Ut = c1−αt [V (k1t , ., kit , .., knt )]α where V is a
sub-utility function which is defined over a potentially large amount of capital invested
in each of the N firms, kit .The expected utility of the representative risk-averse investor
becomes
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((RN − xi )kit )α
]
,
where xi = RN(1− pi ) − pi F is the transfer per unit of capital paid by the represen-
tative investor to the firm to induce him not to lie. Note that
∑N
i=1 1N ((RN − xi )kit )α
denotes the expected consumption of period t + 1 over the N states of nature. In each
state, which is equally likely with probability 1N , only one firm succeeds.
The investor has to choose: (i) how to divide the total stock of capital between
consumption for the first period and savings and (ii) how to divide the amount of
capital invested Kt among the N different projects available on the financial market
(i.e. choosing kit ∀i = 1, . . . N ).
Step 1 Choose between consumption and savings.
Remark 1 Since all firms are symmetric, wi,h∗ = w ∀i = 1, . . . N . The expected

















Remark 2 Since we have ex ante homogenous firms, we know that in equilibrium
kit = kt ∀i = 1, . . . N . Therefore,
∑N












The investor problem can be rewritten as
MaxKt E(U ) = [K − Kt ]1−α
1
N
(RN − x)α N−α K αt .
FOC : ∂U
∂Kt
= 0 ⇐⇒ (1 − α)Kt − α[K − Kt ] = 0 ⇐⇒ K ∗t = αK .
Note that K ∗t ,which is the saving rule, is proportional to the endowment of capital,
and c∗t = (1 − α)K > 0.
Step 2 Portfolio allocation decision: choose kit ∀i = 1, . . . N .
The investor’s problem is given by














kit = αK .
Remark 1 In equilibrium all firms are symmetric and then xi = x ∀i = 1, . . . N .
Define x˜ = 1N−1
∑
i = j x i .
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Remark 2 In equilibrium kit = kt ∀i = 1, . . . N . Therefore,
∑N−1
i=1 kit = (N − 1)kt =
αK − kit , and thus kt = αK−k
i
t
N−1 . Or similarly,
∑N−1





(N − 1)1−α(αK − kit )α.
The maximization problem could be rewritten as





α(RN − xi )α
































where the last equality was obtained taking into account xi = RN(1− pi )− pi F and
x˜ = RN(1 − p˜ ) − p˜F, where p˜ = 1N−1
∑
i = j pi . 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 The optimal level of voluntary transparency can be obtained
by maximizing the Lagrangian given by,
L(pi , λ) = 1
N
(RN(1 − pi ) − pi F)ki∗t + λ
{
pi − φ(N − 1)




= 0 ⇔ 1
N
(−1)[RN + F]ki∗t +
1
N




+ λ = 0,
∂L
∂λ
≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λ∂L
∂λ
= 0,
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the minimum level of trans-
parency the investor is asking for (i.e. Eq. (4)).
Case (a) Let us assume λ = 0, then ∂L
∂pi
= 0 becomes




The return per dollar invested is RN(1 − pi ) − pi F and it is multiplied by ∂ki∗t
∂pi
whichmeasures themarginal effect on ki∗t of increasing voluntary transparency. There-
fore, Eq. (9) tells us that the optimal level of voluntary disclosure of information is
given when the marginal cost of better governance equals the marginal revenues from
increasing an additional unit of governance transparency. Since pi = p ∀i = 1, . . . N ,
the equation above becomes pi (1+ α1−α N−1N )(RN + F) = RN α1−α N−1N , and thus the
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Notice that if A2 holds, then for sure p∗ > φ(N−1)
(1−φ)+φ(N−1) also holds for sure.
Case (b) assumes that the Eq. (4) binds and thus the candidate solution is pi∗ =
φ(N−1)
(1−φ)+φ(N−1) .But then,λ = 1N ki∗t [(RN+F)−(RN(1−pi∗)−pi∗F) α1−α N−1N 1pi∗ ] < 0
since by A2 the expression in brackets is negative. Consequently, pi∗ = φ(N−1)
(1−φ)+φ(N−1)
cannot be the solution.
Note that p∗ needs to be a number between 12 and 1. Since
RN
RN+F < 1 and
α(N−1)
α(N−1)+(1−α)N < 1, transparency is far from perfect in equilibrium. Moreover p
∗









holds in equilibrium. Furthermore, it is easy to check that wi,h∗ > 0. Finally,
assumptions A2 and A2 imply that 1N < φ <
R(N−1)α
R(N−1)α+(N−1)[F(N−α)+R(1−α)N ] ,




R(N−1)α+(N−1)[F(N−α)+R(1−α)N ] . 	unionsq
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